Perspective: Rethinking hearts and minds and the death of Yahya Sinwar

Confirmation that Israeli forces killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar not only highlights the success of Israeli tactics, but could also be the death knell for the doctrine of hearts and minds, the cornerstone of the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine as the U.S. pursued its enemies in wake of 9/11.
Sinwar’s death is notable because it was the latest in an uncompromising campaign by Israel to root out its enemies in spite of the cost, in spite of civilian casualties. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “eliminate at any cost” approach is reminiscent of the last major insurgency of the 20th century — the Russia-Chechen wars of 1994 to 2009.
The first Chechen war, 1994-1996, was led by an anemic Russian President Boris Yeltsin and ended in the defeat of Russian forces in Chechnya — a disgrace for Russia. Although it wasn’t free of brutality and human rights violations, Russia tried to play the first war by rules largely heralded by the West and independent media coverage of the conflict.
These conditions effectively led to Russia’s demise in Chechnya. It was a dark day for Russia and a day soon-to-be Russian President Vladimir Putin wouldn’t forget.
Shortly after becoming president, Putin again guided Russia to war in Chechnya. This time, the gloves were off. If insurgents were known to be in a village, the entire village was razed, its inhabitants killed or imprisoned.
Males, often in their early teens up to mid-60s, were detained and put in filtration camps. Chechens died in droves, and many tens of thousands of Chechen refugees fled for surrounding countries.
Eventually Russia regained full control of Chechnya as a result of this scorched-earth policy and the turning of one of Chechnya’s significant families to Moscow’s cause.
Russian operatives continued to hunt down those deemed significant enough, and the killings, the score settling, continued in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bosnia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
Tens of thousands of Chechens eventually reached the relative safety of Western Europe, where the rule of law and law enforcement were stronger. Still, Chechens were hunted down and killed in Poland, Dubai, Berlin and Vienna. Putin’s ability to wage the war necessary to win, in spite of high casualties and negative global public opinion, secured Russia’s victory.
Today, Netanyahu is effectively using the same strategy. Some have called what Israel is doing in Gaza and Lebanon a genocide. This is incorrect and simply untrue. True genocide, if that was the intention, would have easily led to Palestinian deaths in an order of magnitude higher than what has played out. However, Netanyahu, similar to Putin in Chechnya, has been laser-focused on eliminating threats to Israel, hunting down those that seek to harm Israel.
Civilian casualties and negative public opinion, even at home, are a secondary consideration. And the policy has been largely successful; all senior leaders of Hezbollah have been killed, the leader of Hamas and scores of its ranks have been killed and nearly a dozen or more senior Iranian military figures have been killed.
This strategy works and begs a reexamination of the U.S. attempt to fight and win its recent wars with a premium on the protection of noncombatants. As many Iraq and Afghanistan veterans would say, with one hand behind their back.
So where does the world go from here? Is this the new face of warfare? Not really. Russia and Israel have used it to perfection and proved that it works — at least in the short term.
Dodge Billingsley is the director of Salt Lake City-based Combat Films and Research and an analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office, TRADOC-G2, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth. He has spent significant time in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq. He is the author of “Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian-Chechen Wars 1994-2009.”